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Abstract
The World Beyond Your Head: On Becoming an Individual in an Age of Distraction by Matthew Crawford.
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, April 2015.
Most of us think of distraction as a mere annoyance— a mild humming in the background while you work,
a fly landing on your book while you read. We do not usually think of it carrying the weight of a serious
moral problem. In his new book, The World Beyond Your Head, Matthew Crawford argues that our inability
to pay attention does carry such moral weight, and he argues this precisely because it dissolves our
individuality and our freedom.
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viduality and our freedom.
Crawford is not the first to note the challenge of attention in our day. Nor is he the first to equate our liberal
age with the fading of the individual into a nondescript
mass. What makes his book so valuable is his connection of the two. Distraction and the dissolution of the
individual are related problems that arise as a result
of a loss of connection to material reality, the world of
flesh, blood, wire, and mud.
Crawford resists the temptation to simply scapegoat
“technology,” arguing instead that blame for this loss
should be directed at our cultural assumptions about
what it means to be rational and free. In short, it is not
only our phones that are killing us with distraction, it
is our epistemology and our anthropology, our understanding of how we know and who we are.
Crawford argues that the modern notion of rationality
proposed by Descartes, Locke, and Kant is premised
on a deep suspicion of the sort of knowledge gained
through interaction with objects or people in the
world. This understanding of rationality constituted a
philosophical revolution:
The World Beyond Your Head: On Becoming an Individual in an Age of Distraction by Matthew Crawford.
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, April 2015.
Most of us think of distraction as a mere annoyance—
a mild humming in the background while you work,
a fly landing on your book while you read. We do not
usually think of it carrying the weight of a serious
moral problem. In his new book, The World Beyond
Your Head, Matthew Crawford argues that our inability to pay attention does carry such moral weight, and
he argues this precisely because it dissolves our indi-

The standard for truth is relocated: it is no longer
found out in the world, but inside our own head. .
. . Attention is therefore demoted. Or rather, it is
redirected. Not by fastening on objects in the world
does it help us grasp reality, but by being directed to
our own processes of thinking, and making them
the object of scrutiny.
There is an ominous consequence to this: if we have no
basis other than our own minds for confirming this
reality—either in the physical world or in community—we become vulnerable to mediated presentations
of the world. Using advertising and casinos as case
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studies, Crawford shows that very sophisticated people
are keenly aware that attention has a basis in the real
world, and they have invested considerably in learning how to monopolize our attention. Far from empowering us, our commitment to rational autonomy
and choice has left us susceptible to “hyper-palatable
stimuli” that others use to own as much of our limited
attention as possible. And monopolized attention, like
a monopoly in the economy, leads to sameness and the
loss of individuality. Ironically, the project intended to
free individuals from dogma, superstition, and political control ends with conformity.
Crawford, like a steampunk Alasdair MacIntyre,
argues that we need a different rationality if we want
to be free. We need to go into the world beyond our
heads. To show us what that rationality looks like,
he takes us on a tour of Taylor and Boody, an organmakers’ shop in Virginia. The picture that emerges
from the sawdust and stacks of organ pipes is a type of
rationality he calls “an ecology of attention.” An organ
cannot be made simply by studying paper representations of organs in books. Organ makers must work
within a tradition handed down by previous generations of organ makers. These traditions enable us to
pay attention to both material constraints (e.g., certain
woods produce better or worse music) and how such
constraints can help achieve the purpose of the instrument: the making of church music. Yet these constraints are not meant to choke or bind. “Those who
work within a craft tradition cannot identify the good
with the old,” notes Crawford. Organ making, like
philosophy, is “a living tradition,” “a living conversation, concretely expressed in action.”
To be educated, notes Crawford, is to “be led out
of oneself.” He beautifully captures the communal
and historical nature of learning when he cites Iris
Murdoch’s meditation on learning Russian: “Love of
Russian leads me away from myself towards something alien to me, something which my consciousness
cannot take over, swallow up, deny or make unreal.”
Being educated requires submitting to authoritative
structures—to competent authorities—which serve as
a check on your subjectivity.
These structures are found in what Crawford calls
communities of skilled practice, where “competence
rests on an apprehension of real features of the world,
as refracted through some set of human needs/desires

and corresponding technologies.” In short, says Crawford, “We think through the body.”
Crawford’s book is intended to be more than a selfhelp manual. It is an encouragement to discover or
recover what makes us human in the first place, and so
to become fully human. Given this focus, you might
expect him to discuss religion. But religion, at least
insofar as it is typically understood, doesn’t play much
of a role in his book. Why is this?
Crawford tacitly assumes that religion focuses on the
immaterial and on things beyond this world. We see
this assumption in a passage where Crawford speaks
most clearly about the deeper impulse guiding his
work on attention:
[The] possibilities for beautiful human action in the
world as it is—the undiscovered possibilities of fit—
seem inexhaustible. This can inspire wonder and
gratitude: the most creditable of religious intuitions
is available within a this-worldly ethic of attention [emphasis added]. For there does seem to be
something benevolent in the disposition of things,
relative to us. Such are the rules of gravity and
buoyancy that surfing is possible. ... To encounter
things [and people] in this way is basically erotic, in
the sense that we are drawn out of ourselves toward
beauty.
Indeed the transcendent can be experienced in this
world. In a sense, surfing is magical. The same is true
within the bounds of other material practices. Sex is
transcendent. This is true whether you believe in God
or not. And someone who believes in God can—indeed should—support those who want to recognize
beauty and the sublime in the material world.
But will a “this-worldly ethic of attention” do all the
work that Crawford wants it to do?
Crawford wants to move beyond the relativism that
results from living in our heads and to re-establish
both the self and the commons. But I’m not certain
that this can be done without getting behind an ethics
of attention to what we might call a hermeneutics of
attention. How does one go about deciding what is
worthy of our attention, even if we agree that it should
be something concrete? While it is certainly possible
to shape what Crawford calls the “attentional com-
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mons” without providing a definitive answer to ultimate questions, I am less certain that we can achieve
it without robust discussion of them. Communities of
practice are important, but without guidance on how
they fit together or political authorities to address and
shape law to accommodate or encourage them—we
are likely to end up with relativism again. A better
relativism, perhaps, but relativism nonetheless. If we
are to understand with Crawford that life itself is an
act of craftsmanship, we need the same tools that any
craftsman needs: authoritative structures, disciplines,
habits, and masters who can help us craft good lives.
Alan Jacobs notes that Crawford doesn’t tell us enough
about how “philosophy is far more a product of existing social and economic structures than it is an independent entity.” My question for Crawford is similar:
Who, or which community, is competent to guide us
in crafting good lives?
Crawford does not tell us.
His failure to address this issue, however, doesn’t
diminish the quality of his book. In fact it is instructive for those of us who find in the church—which also
knows through the body—the community most competent to help us become truly human. While reading
this book I found it helpful to pause occasionally and
consider to what extent the church is living up to its
confession, not of the “mind” or “conscience,” but of
the “body” of Christ, who is very much, by definition,
“this worldly.”

importance of religion has less to do with direct appeals to the transcendent and more to do with celebrating the transcendent within the immanent.
Christian worship, by definition, calls us out of our
head to attend to God and neighbor. And if we take
Crawford’s words at face value, this is erotic attention.
Which leads me to think that Christianity is particularly well suited to meet the anxieties of our age.
Christianity is, after all, a religion of transcendence
made immanent. After all, who is Jesus but Immanuel? Our God wore diapers and was breastfed. Rather
than asking Crawford and any number of others in
our haunted age who don’t find themselves gripped by
these questions to be persuaded of this intellectually,
perhaps the church could concentrate—not only in our
Sunday-morning liturgies but also in those we practice
Monday through Saturday—on showing that it is the
body of the God who came in the flesh, the arch-community of concrete human practice.
Perhaps what our anxious age is waiting for are fewer
saints like Benedict, and more saints like Joseph.

***
Crawford’s attempt to find meaning within the world
is a case study in what Charles Taylor has called in A
Secular Age the “nova effect,” which he describes as
“the felt dissatisfaction at this immanent order,” which
“motivates not only new forms of religion, but also different readings of immanence.” Taylor goes on to note,
So the need for meaning can be met by a recovery of
transcendence, but we can also try to define the “one
thing needful” in purely immanent terms. ... Without appeal to religion, we can seek to give resonance
to the everyday, to nature and the things around
use, by calling on our own depth sense.
Readers of Crawford’s book who care about religion
should take note. Perhaps persuading others of the
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